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Abstract
Introduction The liberalisation of the Railways imposed by
European Directives introduces competition in a sector tra-
ditionally organised largely through national monopolies.
As a result, the analysis of the competition particularly on
a given route is very recent.
Approach The approach and methodologies so far devel-
oped to analyse the competition between European rail
operators have resulted in interesting but isolated efforts.
Developments based on game theory and analysis of strate-
gic decision as part of the organisational economics theory
have proven to be the most appropriate. This paper introdu-
ces an improvement on these methodologies by using the
principles of consumer behaviour theory and the analysis
capabilities of game theory to develop a dedicated purpose-
built modelling tool for the analysis of intermodal competi-
tion within the operator’s revenue function. To validate the
model, a forecast analysis on the Madrid-Barcelona high
speed corridor has been performed.
Conclusions The resulting model allows quantifying the min-
imum requirements for a new operator to stay in the market as
well as the equilibrium price and level of investment required.
Keywords Railways . High-speed . Competition .
Liberalisation . Game theory
1 Introduction
During the 1990s the progressive decline of the railway market
share in Europe prompted the European Commission to start a
deep and fundamental process of transformation. A number of
legislative measures grouped into what is known as Railway
Packages aimed at gradually creating a competitive single Eu-
ropean Railway System were introduced. One of the primary
implications of this process is the introduction of competition
through the liberalisation of transport service operations.
One these recent Directives is focused on the liberalisa-
tion of international passenger services [19]. This is a crit-
ical step as effectively opened up the passenger market from
2010. This legislation, supported by additional documents
such as the Transport White Paper [18] that led to the 2011
version has transformed the European railway system intro-
ducing the legal requirement of full legal and commercial
separation between infrastructure ownership and service
providers. These requirements are the catalysts of a deep
restructuring of all national railway companies as well as the
newly formed operators willing to enter the market.
The level of competition introduced and the pace in which
such process is taking place varies between European member
States depending on the way and time scales the Directives
have been incorporated into the national laws. In some cases,
there have been considerable delays in its adoption. In other
cases, national monopolies have been drastically reduced or
have even disappeared, as is for the now extinct British Rail.
The introduction of these European Directives has effec-
tively created two types of structures, namely:
& Independent organisations running the infrastructure and the
operations as is the case in countries such as France, UK,
Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands,
Spain;
& Holding organisations integrating both the infrastructure
managers and the former state-owned railway operator
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(passenger and freight). Examples include Germany,
Belgium and Italy;
The differences in adopting these Directives have promp-
ted the need to quantify the level of implementation of the
liberalisation process in order to be able to do an accurate
comparison. Kirchner [26–29] introduced on behalf of Deut-
sche Bahn AG1 the Rail Liberalisation Index (LIB Index)
widely acknowledged as the reference method to perform
such comparison. The LIB Index assesses on a regular basis
the level of openness of the rail transport markets within the
European Union member States plus Norway and Switzer-
land. It uses a system of three different indexes based on
legal and practical barriers for newcomers (LEX, ACCESS,
COM) and four categories (pending departure, delayed, on
schedule, advanced) to rank on a scale from 100 to 1,000
points the level of liberalisation. In its more recent edition,
only the UK, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Austria and The
Netherlands achieve advanced ranking (800–1,000 points).
This means that only these six countries out of twenty-seven
have completely incorporated the European Directives and
legislation. New railway undertakings willing to access
these markets have no significant barriers to do so.
However, the LibIndex has its limitations as it only
assesses the level of implementation of the existing regula-
tion, referring to it generally as competition level. Knorr and
Eichinger [30] performed a critical appraisal of the Lib
Index highlighting its key limitations.
To analyse the level of competition between operators,
economic theory and industrial organisation indicators are
widely accepted and acknowledged. In particular, the con-
centration index and industrial profitability which measure
in detail the rates of profit and the market share [48].
To guarantee the future of the railway sector, the analysis
of the competition and in particular the access of new
operators is required [18]. Therefore, understanding the
conditions that allow stable access of new railway operators
under the upcoming liberalisation framework is at the core
of the analysis carried out and presented in this paper. More
specifically, the analysis focuses on the following:
– The strategic decisions that incumbent and newcomer
operators need to take;
– The need for maximising profits;
– The operational costs incurred;
– The allocation of ticket prices and frequency of services
as variables directly influencing competition;
Policy and political decisions are not part of the work as
they are related to welfare analysis.
The model described in this paper aims to illustrate in a
simple but effective way the complex web of strategic decisions
a company needs to take in order to survive in a given sector of
the economy. In this case the model focuses on the intramodal
competition between an incumbent operator and a new operator
trying to enter the market. The competition is based on basic
variables such as ticket prices, frequency of service, core invest-
ment and operational costs. The competition between modes
(high speed rail and air mainly) will also be considered in the
Madrid-Barcelona case study.
The liberalisation process was officially adopted in Spain
with the introduction of a national law at this effect [32]
entering into force on 01 January 2005 for passenger serv-
ices and a year later for freight operators.
In this context, the latest set of data available from 2009 [6]
shows that there are currently eleven operating licences allo-
cated in Spain, six of which have already their safety case
approved. The data also shows that there are two distinctive
profiles of new operators entering the market [33]. Those
wholly owned by companies from the construction industry
operating freight services and bus operators whose ultimate
objective is to run rail passenger services but who apply for
freight licences. Construction companies have identified clear
synergies between their container operations at ports and the
movement of construction materials for their buildings. For
bus operators, the running of rail freight services is seen as a
key step to acquire necessary knowledge and skills about the
rail market and running of rail operations.
This paper describes the analysis of railway competition
using a traditional modelling approach (section 2) but to which
we propose an alternative by introducing potential analysis of
intermodal competition in the revenue function through the use
of a logistic or logit function showing the market share of each
operator and the competing transport modes on the same
corridor (section 3). The particular case of the Madrid-
Barcelona corridor is described and used to validate the model
(section 4) leading to a set of conclusions (section 5).
2 Literature review: Evolution of the railways
liberalisation process analysis
2.1 Methods using econometrics approach for various
transport modes
The analysis of liberalisation processes is relatively recent,
particularly applied to the transport sector. Traditionally re-
search in this area has been focused on competitiveness,
productivity and technology efficiency [12] using cost analy-
sis [8, 51]. Financial studies related to railways were already
carried out at the time [4, 25] as it has been studies regarding
network externalities [14] and the analysis of the influence of
infrastructure investment on social aspects and wellbeing [37].
These studies into the financial situation of railways
prompted the need to analyse the behaviour of passengers.1 German National railway
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To address these new needs, discreet choice techniques were
developed [5, 17, 34, 49]. Discreet choice models are now
widely used, having been applied to not only to passenger
transport but also freight and maritime transport [16]. The
European Commission’s Transport White Paper [19] specif-
ically highlights the continuous and systematic misalign-
ment of supply and demand as one of the most significant
problems facing the railway sector.
The liberalisation of the air and railway transport sectors
instigated expanding the scope of the studies in to areas such
as structures for contestable markets, competitiveness and
regulation [3]. Potential increases in the capacity of the
transport networks and efficient ways to realise them were
also covered by these studies [13, 47].
The combined analysis applied to the railway sector of all
the previous (productivity and technology efficiency, discreet
modal choice and contestable markets) has provided interesting
results. Preston et al. [38] made a first attempt to apply these
theories to the railway sector, by analysing the potential impact
of introducing new rail operators competing on an existing
passenger corridor. Whelan and Johnson [52, 53] developed a
model based on demand and costs functions analysing the
potential outcomes of introducing competition in the railway
sector. These included potential offers that could be made if an
auction system was to be used to allocate operation licences
over specific routes as well as the use and running of stations.
These first attempts resulted in the development of two
modelling tools, namely PRAISE [52] and MOIRA [1, 50].
PRAISE rail operations model analyses the interaction be-
tween supply and demand coupled with issues such as
temporary reduced capacity of the network. Similar ap-
proach is taken by MOIRA, developed by AEATechnology
Rail (Currently DeltaRail).
2.2 Improvements on econometrics approach
The econometrics approach can be improved by introducing
two elements, namely:
& Discrete choice models, improving the estimation of
demand functions to reflect more accurately the process
whereby the passenger decides which transport mode to
choose;
& Game theory to better reflect the strategies adopted by
each of the operators involved.
Current practice in analysing the behaviour of the different
stakeholders involved in a particular sector of the industry uses
a combination of industrial management theory, game theory
and discrete choice theory. For instance, these have been suc-
cessfully applied to the analysis of intramodal competition in
the aviation sector since its liberalisation process started in the
early 1990s. Berry [7] developed a model for estimating the
access conditions of new operators to the air passenger sector.
Ivaldi and Vives [24] analyse competition in the railway
sector applying Game Theory, using a demand function
based on a nested logit. Alder et al. [2] focused on studying
the social benefits attached to the competition between high
speed rail and air transport in Europe using a two stages
model based on Game Theory.
Current additional tendencies analyse the infrastructure and
access charges that best suit potential competitors as well as
policies aimed at regulating access charges to congested sec-
tions of the railway network [15] or the air sector [11].
2.3 Applicability remarks
As a result of all the previous work, the models developed
can be clustered into two main groups applicable to the
railway case depending if there are based on econometric
tools or tools using strategies analysis and game theory:
A first group includes models that focus on solving a
partial equilibrium algorithm, ignoring the analysis of strat-
egies and the interaction of the decisions made by different
operators. Examples of this include the intermodal analysis
modelling by Marc Ivaldy and Catherine Vibes [23, 24], the
demand and cost function based models developed by Pres-
ton et al. [38], Wheelan and Johnson [52] and Glass [20] as
well as the early models applied to transport analysing the
strategic behaviour and price equilibrium situations by
Brander and Zhang [9] and Oum et al. [36]. All these
models provide results limiting the analysis of potential
future situations;
A second group is formed by models that use the capa-
bilities of microeconomics analysis based on game theory
and the definition of strategies based on organisational the-
ory. In addition such models tend to also include testbed
experimental data. Within this group there is a particular
type of model that focuses on the analysis of access to the
network which is essential to the liberalisation assessment.
At the core of these models is the allocation of capacity slots
allowing the detailed analysis of the relationship between
infrastructure managers and railway operators using an auc-
tions approach based on experiments. Cox et al. [15] used
this approach to analyse competition involving allocation of
rights to use station and time-slot routes by price bids in a
combinatorial auction with competition involving allocation
of rights to regional monopolies by fare-structure bids for
supplying a pre-specified minimum schedule. Brewer and
Plott [10] developed a mechanism based on combinational
auctions to assess the decentralised allocation of access
rights to the Swedish rail network. Other models focus
exclusively on the allocation of slots such as those devel-
oped by Nilsson [35] and Isacsson and Nilsson [22]. Also
part of this group are models assessing the choice between
frequency and the type of vehicle and their implications in
terms of costs [39].
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3 Spanish context
The liberalisation process was officially adopted in Spain by
passing a Law (ley 39/2003) which came into force on 1st
January 2005 for passenger-related services and a year later
for freight services.
This paper applies the model to the conditions in the
Spanish rail passenger market, with one operator having a
dominant position. In particular, the high speed rail corridor
between Madrid and Barcelona, which has been subject of a
number of economic [46] and air-rail competition studies
[21]. In addition, de Rus and Inglada [43] and de Rus and
Nombela [45] have performed comprehensive cost-benefit
analyses of the high speed rail case for Spain.
In this context, the latest set of data available [6] shows
that there are eleven operating licences allocated in the
country, of which six of them have their safety cases already
approved. The data also shows that there are two distinctive
profiles of new operators entering the market [33]. Those
wholly owned by companies from the construction industry
operating freight services and bus operators whose ultimate
objective is to run rail passenger services but who apply for
freight licences. Construction companies have identified
clear synergies between their container operations at ports
and the movement of construction materials for their build-
ings. For bus operators, the running of rail freight services is
seen as a key step to acquire necessary knowledge and skills
about the rail market and running of rail operations.
4 The model
The model described in this paper considers the work de-
scribed in section 2, particularly in reference to the use of
cost and revenue functions although it has significant differ-
ences in the way the three theories are combined. It allows
the competition simulation of the railway market behaviour
using a specific demand and costs structure in the second
stage of the model (see section 3), introducing techniques
used in capital investment analysis. This analysis includes
the considerations of Berry [7] regarding market share. A
logit function has been used for this purpose. The method-
ology basis of this widely used technique assumes that the
cost reduction is already achieved and therefore the focus
must be directed at increasing revenue by expanding the
market share. The model complies with the Nash equilibri-
um point mathematical conditions establishing that in order
to be unique it must be the absolute maximum (necessary
and sufficient conditions). The model also complies with
pay-off functions in relation to the definition of the reaction
functions. Pay-off functions identify the response of a par-
ticular player (railway operator in this case) to the choices of
the rest of the players (competing operators).
The outcome of the model as a result of the application of
mathematical tools defined by the Game Theory complies
with economic theory, allowing the valid interpretation of
such results. This is considered when defining the demand,
cost and benefit functions as well as the key conditions
establishing the costs and charges (ticket prices), allowing
a more inclusive view of the competition environment.
The application of the concepts described above make
possible the modelling of competition in the railway sector.
This provides the entry conditions that a new operator must
adopt in a competing market.
The model has the potential to be further developed to
include additional railway stakeholders introducing the in-
frastructure manager and the decisions related to the value
and level of access charges [31]. However this would jeop-
ardise the accuracy and scope of the results as it would not
allow the in-depth analysis of the competition relationship
between operators which are considered as essential to the
success of the liberalisation process.
The potential social benefits deriving from the introduction
of competing rail passenger services are out of the scope of the
model here presented. Also out of scope is the effects intro-
duced by an operator running network services as opposed to
A to B services and/or in combination with other transport
modes (an air transport style “hub and spoke” approach).
Instead, the work focuses on the strategic decisions that the
operators must take to enter a competing market. The method-
ology developed by the authors is based on a simple analytical
model describing the competition between two railway oper-
ators and between these and other modes (Low-cost airlines
mainly) in a Bertrand two stage game. The model and its
methodology here presented offer a clear analysis of overall
passenger demand management from all possible transport
modes on the given corridor using a market share approach.
Critically, it also provides with a clear assessment of how the
competition measures introduced for the railway services lib-
eralisation affect the overall market share of rail, which is one
of the main objectives of the European policy for the sector.
The model developed is a two-stage game model as
shown in the diagram in Fig. 1 (Fig. 1).
On the first stage the new operators decide whether they
enter or not the market based on the available information. On
the second stage the new operators has entered the market and
start competing with the established operator. The quantifica-
tion of the fixed costs is included in the investment require-
ments calculation (see section 5.4). The competition in prices
will define the survival of the operators in the market.
4.1 Profit, cost and demand function
This section describes the profit function of the rail opera-
tors competing in the corridor including intermodal
competition.
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Profit function The profit function for each of the i railways
operators (1) is as follows:
Y
i
¼ Ii  Ci ¼ piqi ¼ ciqi ¼ qi pi  cið Þ ¼ siQi pi  cið Þ
ð1Þ
Where i is the operating company.Πi represents the profit
made by operator i (€), Ii is its turnover (€) and Ci (€) is the
term representing its costs. pi represents the price (€) of a
ticket and qi the demand (number of passengers) which is a
function of the market share (si) of a given operator in
relation to the total demand for the corridor (number of
passengers). Qt is the total demand in the corridor. In this
environment the operators use ticket price competition to
achieve a market share as defined by Berry [7].
Demand function The demand (d) function (2) includes the
prices and specific conditions for each operator. It critically
improves current methods by focusing on the decision pro-
cess introducing a logit Eq. (3).
diðpÞ ¼ Qtsi ð2Þ
si ¼ xix01 þ x02 þ xr
i ¼ 01; 02; r
xi ¼ exp xið Þ
x01 ¼ exp b01 þ bp01ð Þ
x02 ¼ exp b02 þ bp02ð Þ
xr ¼ exp bprð Þ
ð3Þ
Where β01 and β02 are specific constants representing all
possible economic factors not related to prices (prices are
included in β which is related to the price functions of all
operators and transport modes). Parameter x represents
conditional changes in the probability of choosing a specific
transport mode related to infinitesimal variations in the
specific constant and price. β01 and β02 encapsulate all
factors affecting the competition such as regulation, policy,
specific access conditions, entry barriers, constants repre-
senting elements of the competition for an established oper-
ator (01) and an operator willing to enter the market (02) not
being covered by price. These include brand image, reputa-
tion, technical and operational practical knowledge of the
corridor and network statement. Table 1 summarises the
scope of β01 and β02 values.
The two rail operators considered in the analysis are
noted as operator 01 (E01) representing an established com-
petitor (state-owned companies which used to have a mo-
nopoly in the sector) and operator 02 (E02) representing a
new competitor willing to enter the market. Operator r (Er)
represents the rest of operators other than railways compet-
ing in the same market/corridor. In the case of high speed
rail competition for the Madrid-Barcelona corridor this
means low-cost airlines.
The demand function uses a multinomial logit that calcu-
lates the probability of a passenger choosing a specific operator
once he/she has decided to travel and by which transport mode.
The only limitation of the model is that the total demand for
competing services (rail and air transport) is determined prior
to running the model. The competition in ticket prices does
Table 1 description of specific constant values
Β Description
0 The reputation of the operator has no effect
0.5 Medium effect. The operator has certain level of trust
and loyalty from its passengers giving a slight
advantage.
1 Strong effect. The operator has full trust and loyalty
from its passengers giving a clear competitive
advantage.
Fig. 1 diagram of the Rail
Competition Model
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not include the upper and lower limits of the price range that
could attract potential additional passengers from other trans-
port modes such as coach travel or private cars [42].
Cost function This function includes only variable costs as
fixed costs are already considered in the first stage when
operators carry out an assessment process prior to deciding
whether or not entering the market based on investment
requirements.
Using the equilibrium point approach the model evalu-
ates the competition and its viability in the long term.
4.2 Equilibrium point analysis
This section addresses the competition between two rail
operators using the functions and restrictions already
defined. The equilibrium is solved in the second stage
(Fig. 1) using backward induction.
First stage: the railway operators establish their invest-
ment and fixed costs to decide whether or not to enter in
competition;
Second stage: the operators that do enter the market
start a price competition to obtain a market share that
guarantees their permanence;
The optimum response (4) of the established operator E01
to a ticket price (p02) set by the new operator E02 it is
represented by a reaction function R01(p02) obtain from
maximising the profits function (1).
@
Q
01
@p01
¼ q01 þ p01  c01ð Þ @q01
@p01
¼ 0
@
Q
01
@p01
¼ s01Qt þ p01  c01ð Þ @s01Qt
@p01
¼ 0
ð4Þ
Where:
@s01Qt
@p01
¼ b exp b01þbp01ð Þs b exp b01þbp01ð Þð Þ exp b01þbp01ð Þð Þs2 Qt ¼
¼ bs bs01ð Þ expðb01þbp01ð Þs
h i
Qt ¼ Qtbs01 1 s01ð Þ
s01 ¼ exp b01þbp01ð Þexp b01þbp01ð Þþexp b02þbp02ð Þþexp bprð Þ ¼
exp b01þbp01ð Þ
s ; s01
¼ exp b01 þ bp01ð Þ
@
Q
01
@P01
¼ Qts01 þ p01  c01ð Þ b 1 s01ð Þð ÞQts01 ¼ 0
For further detail of the results please see annex 01.
5 Application to theMadrid-Barcelona high speed corridor
The model has been designed to assess the competition in a
European high speed rail corridor. The Madrid-Barcelona
corridor has been chosen for its high density of passengers
and profit margins being generated for the current operator
(established) which makes it potential an attractive option
for new operators willing to enter competition. In addition it
also fulfils the characteristics already identified by De Rus et
al. [44] suggesting that if true competition in the railway
passenger sector does take place it would be in duopoly
conditions with just two competing operators (established
and newcomer) and only on high density corridors.
5.1 Equilibrium prices
The first effect of the prospect of an increase in competition is
a reduction of the equilibrium prices as a result of the possi-
bility that the new comer operator E02 will reduce its costs.
Annex 02 provides information about corridor demand and
operating costs. The value of the access specific constant as
defined in the model varies between 0, 0.5 and 1 [42].
The operative costs reduction achieved by the new operator
(E02) allows introducing lower prices than those of operator
E01 leading to an increased market share on the basis of equal
quality of service provided. For instance the model predicts
that a 25 % operative costs reduction for operator E02 would
lead to an establishing equilibrium prices 15.4 % lower
(10.6 % if the specific constant is 0.5) which would also reduce
the effects of the access specific constant (β02) by 20 %
(21.7 % if the specific constant is 0.5).
5.2 Market share
To obtain the market share of the three competitors E01, E02,
Er, the multinomial logit function (5) is applied as follows:
s01 ¼ exp bp01þb01ð Þexp bp01þb01ð Þþexp bp02þb02ð Þþexp bprð Þ
s02 ¼ exp bp02þb02ð Þexp bp01þb01ð Þþexp bp02þb02ð Þþexp bprð Þ
sr ¼ exp bprð Þexp bp01þb01ð Þþexp bp02þb02ð Þþexp bprð Þ
ð5Þ
Table 2 shows the market share results from the model.
The price reduction introduced by E02 proves to be an
effective measure. It permits E02 to obtain a proportion of
the established operator market share as well as the competitor
r. An approximate price reduction of 10 % gives E02 a 9 %
market share. The weighting factor of the specific constant
reduces this advantage in 1 % suggesting that the bigger the
relevance of the historical aspects the bigger the cost reduction
needed by E02 to maintain its competitive position.
The analysis of the market share offers some insights into the
intermodal competition. The price reduction and competition be-
tween operators E01 and E02 results in a constant reduction of the
market share of the operator Er. Therefore, even if the prices of the
established operator E01 have to rise due to the specific constant,
the equilibrium prices always remain below the price of operator
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Er (€70), attracting more passengers. These results are in line with
field research studies conducted on the same corridor [40, 41].
5.3 Additional results from the model: Operators profits
and yield calculation
Although the model can obtain the equilibrium prices and mar-
ket share values directly, these can also be calculated by applying
the profit function derived from the model itself. Table 3 sum-
marises the profits as predicted by the model using Eq. (4).
By analysing these figures, the competitive advantage related
to the access specific constant can be quantified. They show that
competitive advantage in terms of costs obtained by the new
operator E02 can be sufficient to neutralise the effect of the
access specific constant as this affects not only costs but also
prices, reflecting in the market share of the operator. Only with
higher values of the specific constant the established operator
E01 can obtain bigger profits than the newcomer operator E02.
This means that this can only be achieved if renfe operadora
(E01) can utilise its position as established operator in this
corridor by transmitting more confidence than its competitors.
This is valid as long as the newcomer operator matches
the established operator passenger loading factor (70 %) and
its rolling stock has a capacity of at least 329 seats (estimat-
ed average per train using a 70 % loading factor)
Investment requirements calculation The results shown so
far are related to the characteristics of the competition be-
tween two railway operators and a third operator from other
transport mode. However the entry conditions for a new
operator need to be considered by analysing its fixed costs
and calculating investment requirements.
The process stars identifying the fixed costs of the new
operator which are related to its investment needs. These
costs are obtained calculating the number of vehicles re-
quired to achieve the market share obtained in the price
competition (see section 5.1) In addition, the model analyses
the capacity of the Madrid-Barcelona corridor.
It is estimated that the new operator would need to run an
average of 6,500 trains per year representing 22 daily trains.
These trains would require compositions of 4 to 6 vehicles as a
minimum. Table 4 shows the investment requirement values
for the different options of rolling stock operations. The cost of
a typical high speed train is in the region of €22 million per
composition or convoy plus an estimated €19 million for
maintenance over its lifetime. This means that the initial capital
investment for the new operator will be around €204 million.
Where A is the costs associated to the acquisition of
rolling stock and B is the difference between benefits and
annual access charges. A discount rate (k) of 5 % is applied.
The results are summarised on Table 4
Where the net present value (NPV) is calculated as fol-
lows (6):
NPV ¼ Aþ B01
1þ kð Þ þ
B02
1þ kð Þ2 þ      þ
Bn
1þ kð Þn
¼ Aþ
Xn
j¼01
Bj
1þ kð Þj
ð6Þ
Table 2 market share results
(source: Renfe Operadora 2005) Access Specific
Constant (β01, β02)
Operational
Costs (C01, C02)
Prices (€) Market share (%)
p01 p02 s01 s02 sr
0 E020E01 59 59 42.7 42.7 14.7
E02<E01 58 54 37.1 52 10.9
0.5 E020E01 61 58 48.4 39.3 12.3
E02<E01 59 53 42.6 48.6 8.8
1 E020E01 63 58 53.7 36 10.3
E02<E01 61 52 47.9 45 7.2
Table 3 Profit calculation results (number of trains source: ADIF network statement)
Access Specific
Constant (β01, β02)
Operational
Costs (C01, C02)
Number of passengers Number of trains per year profit (€)
E01 E02 Er E01 E02 Total E01 E02
0 E020E01 1,493,368 1,493,368 513,264 6,484 6,484 12,969 26,048,059 26,048,059
E02<E01 1,296,788 1,821,737 381,475 5,631 7,910 13,541 20,601,407 37,990,126
0,5 E020E01 1,694,761 1,375,878 429,361 7,359 5,974 13,333 32,865,643 22,670,325
E02<E01 1,490,024 1,700,449 309,528 6,470 7,384 13,854 25,937,573 33,076,591
1 E020E01 1,880,196 1,259,073 360,731 8,164 5,467 13,631 40,635,716 19,669,860
E02<E01 1,674,856 1,573,382 251,762 7,272 6,832 14,104 32,111,166 28,576,842
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The model’s calculation of the fixed costs only considers
rolling stock that could improve the financial situation of the
new operator. Nevertheless, this new operator will be able to
enter the passenger high speed rail services on the Madrid-
Barcelona corridor if it can maximise its competitive advan-
tage in terms of costs. The established operator E01 will be
able to retain its leading position in the market if it can
maintain its core characteristic as the recognised company.
The model can establish the minimummarket share that the
operators are competing for, that is the minimummarket share
to be able to successfully enter the market. In the particular
case of the high speed corridor between Madrid and Barce-
lona, this minimum market share is in the region of 25–30 %.
6 Conclusions
The analysis of the potential competition for passenger
railway services is essential at a time where liberalisation
is being introduced in Europe and when a debate about this
process is still open. The objectives of this liberalisation
process range from financial and market share related to a
more efficient use of existing and future infrastructure
addressing also key sustainability aspects.
The European Commission is proposing to measure com-
petition by setting a number of performance indicators. These
indicators, although able to provide useful comparable infor-
mation do not give an insight on the cause-effect relation that
leads the decision making process by operating companies.
This paper briefly reviews the existing knowledge and
models that facilitate this cause-effect analysis to propose a
specific model that would allow the assessment of the strategic
decisions made by rail operating companies. This model con-
tributes to knowledge by improving existing approaches to
include a logit as part of the revenue function for the operators
which provides the market share gains as a direct result of the
decisions made in a multimodal environment where decision
have an interaction between different operators.
The market share aspects of the model allow a clear anal-
ysis of overall passenger demand management for a whole
corridor, independent of the transport mode. It also allows the
assessment of how the measures introduced in terms of com-
petition affect the total market share of railways which is a
primary objective of European policy for the sector.
A key characteristic of this model is the ability of suc-
cessfully analyse competition between railway operating
companies in a simulated environment. The relation be-
tween economic theory, game theory and the analysis of
strategic decisions and models for analysis of demand in
traffic engineering improve the correlation of new operators
to real operating conditions.
This two-stage model has been applied to the Madrid-
Barcelona corridor to assess the strategic interactions that
could take place. As can be seen from the results includ-
ed in Table 4, there is competitive advantage in what is
referred to as historical fact or reputation of the incum-
bent operator; the greater the value of the access specific
constant the greater the profits obtained. In equilibrium
the entrant accesses the market if the share is between 25
and 30 %. This is the bracket that ensures its permanence
in the market.
Another key outcome of the results shown in Table 4 is
that measures should be drawn by the new operator to
ensure mitigation of the reputation effect of the incumbent
operator. By keeping the value of the access specific con-
stant as low as possible (0 to 0.5) the new operator will have
a better chance of making profits and maintain its position in
the market.
The analysis has introduce the importance of the effect
that the reputation of a given operating company has and
how a new operator might need to counterbalance this by
establishing a price competition strategy based on reduced
operating costs. The results of the Madrid-Barcelona case
suggest that this is a valid strategy.
The analysis can be completed with the calculation of roll-
ing stock needs (external data model) as shown in Table 3.
Table 4 Investment requirements results
Access Specific
Constant (β01, β02)
Operational
Costs (C01, C02)
Prices (€) Profit (€) Average number
of trains needed
Net Present Value-
NPV (€ mil.)
p01 p02 E01 E02 E02 E02
0 E020E01 59 59 26,048,059 26,048,059 8 13.7
E02<E01 58 54 20,601,407 37,990,126 9 113.6
0,5 E020E01 61 58 32,865,643 22,670,325 7 −9.4
E02<E01 59 53 25,937,573 33,076,591 9 69.6
1 E020E01 63 58 40,635,716 19,669,860 6 −27.4
E02<E01 61 52 32,111,166 28,576,842 8 32.7
60 Eur. Transp. Res. Rev. (2013) 5:53–63
The inputs required for the model are kept simple and
manageable. This, together with the application of the Eco-
nomic Theory and the latest developments in demand func-
tion and costs estimation facilitate a good correlation
between its results and reality. Application to other case
studies can be done in a straightforward and useful manner,
providing the necessary knowledge for analysis prior to the
introduction of competition. Further improvements to the
model can be made through experimental design to analyse
in a more complex and continuous manner all aspects relat-
ed to the liberalisation of railways on a corridor to corridor
basis.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution and
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Annex 01
The following table (Table 5) summarises the results obtained
solving the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium (equilibrium price and
market share) and the reaction functions R1 and R2 determin-
ing the strategies between the operators.
Table 5 Summary of results arising from solving the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium and the reaction functions
Price Maximum profits results
E01 E02
p01 ¼ c01  1b s02þsrð Þ p02 ¼ c02  1b s01þsrð Þ
Equilibrium prices
E01
p*01 ¼ c01  1b 1s01ð Þ ¼¼ c01  1
b
exp b02þbp*02ð Þþexp bp*rð Þ
exp b01þbp01ð Þþexp b02þbp*02ð Þþexp bp*rð Þ
 
E02
p*02 ¼ c02  1b 1s02ð Þ ¼ c02  1
b
exp b01þbp*01ð Þþexp bp*rð Þ
exp b02þbp02ð Þþexp b01þbp*01ð Þþexp bp*rð Þ
 
Reaction function E01 E02
R01 p02ð Þ ¼ c01  1b s02þsrð Þ R02 p01ð Þ ¼ c02  1b s01þsrð Þ
Equilibrium solution SEN ¼ p*01; p*02
  ¼
¼
p*01 ¼ c01 
1
b exp b02þbp
*
02ð Þþexp bp*rð Þ
exp b01þbp01ð Þþexp b02þbp*02ð Þþexp bp*rð Þ
 
0
@
1
A;
p*02 ¼ c02 
1
b exp b01þbp
*
01ð Þþexp bp*rð Þ
exp b01þbp01ð Þþexp b02þbp*02ð Þþexp bp*rð Þ
 
0
@
1
A
8>>>><
>>>>:
9>>>>=
>>>>;
Equilibrium demand E01
q*01 ¼ s01Qt ¼
exp b c01 1b s02þsrð Þ
  
exp b c01 1bðs02þsr Þ
  
þexp b02þbp*02ð Þþexp bp*rð Þ
Qt
E02
q*02 ¼ s02Qt ¼
exp b c02 1b s01þsrð Þ
  
exp b c02 1bðs01þsr Þ
  
þexp b01þbp*01ð Þþexp bp*rð Þ
Qt
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Annex 02
Demand and operating costs in Madrid-Barcelona high
speed rail corridor
Table 6 summarises the demand data (passenger per year)
for the corridor based on a combine historic data and de-
mand forecast analysis.
Table 7 summarises the characteristics and costs for the
exploitation of the corridor.
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